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DOES SCARCITY EXACERBATE THE TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS?  
EVIDENCE FROM FISHERS’ EXPERIMENTAL RESPONSES 
 
Jorge Higinio Maldonado 
Rocio del Pilar Moreno-Sanchez 
Abstract 
 
Economic Experimental Games (EEGs), focused to analyze dilemmas associated with 
the use of common pool resources, have shown that individuals make extraction 
decisions that deviate from the suboptimal Nash equilibrium. However, few studies have 
analyzed whether these deviations towards the social optimum are affected as the stock 
of resource changes. Performing EEG with local fishermen, we test the hypothesis that 
the behavior of participants differs under a situation of abundance versus one of 
scarcity. Our findings show that under a situation of scarcity, players over-extract a 
given resource, and thus make decisions above the Nash equilibrium; in doing so, they 
obtain less profit, mine the others-regarding interest, and exacerbate the tragedy of the 
commons. This result challenges previous findings from the EEG literature. When 
individuals face abundance of a given resource, however, they deviate downward from 
the prediction of individualistic behavior. The phenomenon of private, inefficient over-
exploitation is corrected when management strategies are introduced into the game, 
something that underlines the importance of institutions. 
 
Key words: tragedy of the commons intensified, economic experimental games, 
resource abundance, resource scarcity, dynamic effects. 
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sobre Desarrollo Económico2 
 
¿LA ESCASEZ EXACERBA LA TRAGEDIA DE LOS COMUNES? 




Diversos juegos económicos experimentales (JEE), diseñados para analizar el dilema 
asociado al uso de recursos de uso común, han mostrado que los individuos toman 
decisiones que se desvían del equilibrio de Nash. Sin embargo, pocos estudios han 
analizado si estas desviaciones hacia el óptimo social varían cuando el nivel de recurso 
disponible cambia. Usando JEE con pescadores tradicionales, evaluamos la hipótesis 
de que el comportamiento de los participantes varía en situaciones de abundancia 
comparado con situaciones de escasez. Los resultados muestran que bajo condiciones 
de escasez los jugadores sobre-extraen el recurso, tomando decisiones por encima del 
equilibrio de Nash; tomando este tipo de decisiones, obtienen menos ganancias, 
afectan los intereses colectivos y exacerban la tragedia de los comunes. Este resultado 
desafía hallazgos previos de la literatura de JEE. Sin embargo, cuando los jugadores 
enfrentan abundancia, se desvían del equilibrio privado esperado de Nash hacia el 
óptimo social. Cuando se introducen reglas de manejo de los recursos en el juego, el 
fenómeno de sobre-explotación privada e ineficiente se corrige, lo que resalta la 
importancia de diferentes instituciones para reducir el dilema. 
 
Palabras clave: tragedia de los comunes, juegos económicos experimentales, 
abundancia y escasez, efectos dinámicos.  
 




Fisheries have been identified as the typical case of common-pool resources (CPR), 
one wherein the impossibility of exclusion and the rivalry between users result in their 
degradation. Gordon (1954) argued that this class of resources, which is considered 
“free,” would not be extracted at the proper time; for fishermen, fish remaining in the sea 
are valueless, inasmuch as there is no guarantee of finding them in the future if they are 
left behind today. Hardin (1968) coined the expression “the tragedy of the commons” to 
describe the overuse and consequent depletion and exhaustion suffered by CPRs as a 
result of resource users’ individualistic behavior. Since then, the “tragedy of the 
commons” has been used to describe and explain several situations related to CPR and 
environmental degradation. 
Conflicts associated with CPRs have been widely studied in the economic 
literature, including those related to game theory and behavioral and experimental 
economics. More specifically, the tragedy of the commons has been formalized using 
non-cooperative game theory, wherein communication between players is not permitted 
and all players have complete information about the payoffs associated with their 
respective decisions (Ostrom, 1990). Predictions derived from non-cooperative game 
theory establish that under a CPR scenario, players selecting their best individual 
strategies will not reach a Pareto-optimal outcome, and that individual rational decisions 
will lead to outcomes that are collectively irrational, a paradox known as the prisoner’s 
dilemma (Ostrom, 1990). In other words, individuals facing CPR dilemmas will make 
decisions that lead to a suboptimal Nash equilibrium, rather than pursuing strategies 
that would lead to a social optimum (Cardenas et al., 2003). 
  Evidence from economic experimental games has challenged this theoretical 
prediction, showing that individuals deviate from the Nash equilibrium towards social 
optimum (Ostrom and Walker 1991), and make extraction decisions that balance their 
own and collective interests (Davis and Holt 1993, Kagel and Roth 1995, Cardenas 
2004), even when they are not allowed to communicate with one another (Cardenas, 
2000; Cardenas et al., 2000). For instance, in experimental games conducted in rural 4 
 
villages in Colombia, Cardenas et al. (2000) calculated individual deviations from Nash 
strategies when analyzing the balance between self-regarding and others-regarding 
behavior, and found that when individuals are not subject to any rules, their decisions 
reflect neither Nash strategies nor socially optimal ones, but rather strategies that fall 
somewhere between the two. Additionally, when individuals are subjected to internal 
regulation through communication, their decisions are collectively superior—that is, they 
are more socially efficient (Cardenas et al., 2000).  
  Despite the abundant literature regarding these issues, few studies utilizing 
economic experimental games (EEG) have included the inter-temporal effects 
associated with CPRs. Moreover, as far as we know, the literature has not analyzed 
whether deviations from the Nash equilibrium are affected by changes in the resource 
stock.  
  In an attempt to contribute to the understanding of the effect of those issues, the 
objective of this paper is to investigate—through the application of an EEG on real 
fishermen—the behavior of agents facing CPR dilemmas under two different scenarios, 
both of which are a consequence of aggregated extraction decisions—resource 
abundance and resource scarcity.  
  Our results show that under scarcity and assuming open access, individuals will 
tend to over-extract a resource, even if this constitutes inefficient behavior; this implies 
excessive effort and puts greater pressure on ecological systems. In such a case, the 
tragedy of the commons would be exacerbated. 
  The paper is organized as follows: in the following part, we discuss the literature 
related to our research problem; the third part describes the theoretical model 
supporting our analysis; in the fourth section, we explain the manner in which our 
economic experimental game was carried out; in the fifth section, we present and 
discuss the main results; and, finally, in the last section, some policy implications and 






Dynamic effects may exacerbate CPR-related problems, as individuals might not 
consider the full impact of their current decisions regarding own extraction—likewise, 
the decisions made by others—on future extraction costs. Herr et al. (1997) used 
laboratory experiments to analyze time-independent and time-dependent externalities of 
non-renewable commons, and found, not only that the myopic behavior of individuals 
exacerbates CPR-related problems, but also that even those individuals who take into 
account the current and future effects of extraction decisions will likely enter into a race 
for resources if they believe others are acting myopically. Herr et al. (1997) state that 
when inter-temporal effects (e.g., time dependent externalities) are included in a CPR 
experimental game, the efficiency of resource use will be lower than that obtained in a 
similar time-independent game. Additionally, they show that, in practice, in a time 
dependent game, efficiency is even lower than that predicted in theory—this is because 
of the temporally myopic behavior that is only present when time constitutes a factor in 
the game, inasmuch as it makes the solution process more difficult. 
  The hypothesis that the tragedy of commons might be intensified has been 
analyzed by Corners and Sandler (1983) using a static framework. These authors 
analyze the role of non-zero conjectural variations on the hybrid behavior of fishermen. 
Corners and Sandler (1983) define hybrid behavior as “the maximizing behavior 
predicated on conjectures that one exploiter holds with respect to the way in which the 
other exploiters will respond to his own fishing efforts.” They argue that these 
conjectures are absent in standard CPR models, and that, inasmuch as the presence of 
a non-zero conjectural variation about what an exploiter thinks contains the effect of his 
extraction on other extraction efforts, individual responses will deviate negatively or 
positively from the Nash equilibrium. In order to include conjectures, the authors make 
the benefits experienced by a firm dependent on, in addition to the firm’s own fleet size, 
the expected response (i.e., the hybrid behavior) regarding the size of the fleet of the 
entire industry; the latter is taken as a given in the standard model. As a result, if the 
conjectures are positive—meaning that the firm anticipates that its own increased 
fishing efforts will likely induce other firms to follow suit—the firm’s optimal fleet and the 6 
 
tragedy of the commons will be less than that predicted using the standard solution. In 
contrast, assuming negative conjectures, the firm’s optimal fleet size will be greater than 
the Nash prediction and, consequently, “the tragedy of the commons will be intensified.” 
In the latter case, the Nash equilibrium represents a less pessimistic prediction about 
the exploitation of resources (Corners and Sandler, 1983). 
Corners and Sandler’s paper (1983) leads us to another issue related to CPR 
games, one that has also been scarcely analyzed—that concerning CPR game 
responses above the Nash equilibrium. In a CPR experimental game, individuals have 
to choose their respective levels of extraction from an established range. The Nash 
equilibrium determines the private efficient level of extraction. Deviations below the 
Nash equilibrium may reflect collective behavior or other-regarding preferences, as 
individuals may incorporate a consideration of collective interests in their individual 
extraction decisions—that is, individuals do not necessarily pursue purely self-interested 
strategies, as predicted by theory (Cardenas et al., 2002). Conversely, when individuals 
extract more units than those predicted by the Nash strategy—that is, the deviation is 
above the Nash equilibrium—the conclusion is that they are being very inefficient, 
inasmuch as they are making decisions that negatively impact their own private returns.  
In general, the literature on experimental games tends to focus more on 
analyzing individual deviations towards socially efficient outcomes than privately 
inefficient ones; this is especially true with respect to CPR experimental games. 
Sometimes, privately inefficient outcomes in CPR games have been seen as rare cases 
of the experiment that have not been further analyzed.  For instance, Cardenas et al. 
(2002) performed experimental games in rural villages in Colombia to explore the role of 
economic inequality in the provision of local environmental quality; they found that a 
certain type of player spends more time collecting firewood than what is individually 
optimal. The authors conclude that these decisions are very inefficient, not only 
because they are not optimal in the private sense, but also because they are “more 
environmentally damaging than their Nash strategies” (Cardenas et al., 2002). 
  Other studies have analyzed the private inefficiency associated with the under-
contribution of individuals in public-good games, which, in the mirror case of CPR 
games, constitutes over-extraction or over-exploitation decisions. In linear public-good 7 
 
games, the maximizing private benefit strategy (i.e., the Nash equilibrium) is to allocate 
zero units to the public good and all of them to private activity. However, findings from 
experimental games contradict these predictions, as individuals tend to make important 
contributions to the public good. This finding is robust for treatments where linear game 
designs do not allow for negative contributions. To analyze the possibility of under-
contribution in public game experiments (i.e., deviations below the Nash equilibrium), 
some authors have modified the payoff structure to allow for interior solutions, or partial 
contributions, thus defining payoff functions that are non-linear with respect to both 
private and public good (Keser, 1996; van Dijk and van Winden, 1997; Isaac and 
Walker, 1998; Willinger and Ziegelmeyer, 2001). The findings from such studies have 
been ambiguous. Isaac and Walker (1998) assume a non-linear payoff structure for the 
public good, and find that over-contribution is not significant for high levels of equilibrium 
contribution, moreover, that individuals actually tend to under-contribute. Keser (1996) 
and van Dijk (1997) assume non-linear payoff functions for the private good, and find 
that over-contribution is significant.  
  The literature appears to support the idea that the level of the predicted 
equilibrium contribution plays an important role with respect to contribution decisions, 
and affects the existence of under-contribution as well as its magnitude. Willinger and 
Ziegelmeyer (2001) analyze the strength of the social dilemma vis-à-vis contribution 
behavior; they test four levels of equilibrium (low, medium, high, and very high) and 
assume a quadratic payoff structure for the private good, where the dominant 
equilibrium is a unique interior solution. They reduce the strength of the social dilemma 
by moving the equilibrium contribution to the social optimum, and find that over-
contribution is only significant at a low level of equilibrium contribution. This confirms 
Isaac and Walker’s findings (1998), which show that average over-contribution is 
reduced when the equilibrium level moves towards the Pareto optimum.  
  Despite arriving at similar findings regarding over-contribution as Willinger and 
Ziegelmeyer (2001), Isaac and Walker (1998) find that subjects do tend to under-
contribute when confronted with high levels of equilibrium contribution. Specifically, 
Isaac and Walker (1998) evaluate Nash deviations testing four treatments—the first, 
based on a boundary Nash solution, and the other three, on interior Nash equilibriums 8 
 
at three different levels. Under-contribution is present for all results: in the treatments 
exhibiting the two highest levels of Nash equilibriums, average investments in the public 
good are below the Nash prediction, with the findings being more pronounced for the 
absolute highest equilibrium level. However, under-contribution was not observed for 
either the treatment based on the corner solution, or the treatment where the interior 
solution corresponds to the lowest equilibrium level tested. In summary, Isaac and 
Walker’s (1998) show that “within the same experimental group, some individuals follow 
investment strategies that are highly ‘cooperative’ while others follow strong ‘free riding’ 
strategies, which might explain the under contribution observed in the treatments with 
highest predicted equilibrium levels.” Another important finding from Isaac and Walker 
(1998) is that upward and downward biases are not the result of pure error.  
  In fisheries, private inefficiency is known as Malthusian overfishing. This 
expression was introduced by Pauly (1988, 1990) to describe the over-exploitation of 
fisheries by poor artisanal fishermen in an effort to maintain their income, something 
which in turn leads to a spiral of destruction of marine resources, declining extractions, 
and increasing poverty (Teh and Sumaila, 2006). The concept of Malthusian over-
fishing characterizes the over-exploitation of fisheries as consisting of three elements: i) 
poverty, ii) population growth, and ii) a growing rigidity in income-generating activities 
(Teh and Sumaila, 2006). Although the degradation of CPR fisheries has its own 
explanatory characteristics (e.g., non-excludability and rivalry), it might nonetheless be 
exacerbated where Malthusian over-fishing conditions are present and the respective 
resource is being depleted and becoming scarce. In developing tropical countries, 
fishing communities are characterized by low incomes, low levels of education, the 
utilization of non-appropriate (likewise, non-permitted) fishing methods, and rigidities in 
labor and capital markets that prevent them from pursuing other income-generating 
alternatives, thus making the case for Malthusian overfishing as an explanation of 
fishermen’s behavior. 
Given the above review of the literature concerning approaches examining social 
and private inefficiency in the use of public goods and common-pool resources, we 
focus our contribution on testing the following hypothesis: in dilemmas associated with 
the use of a CPR, specifically fisheries, individuals facing an abundance of resource 9 
 
tend to cooperate (that is, under-extract), even when no rules are applied; however, 
cooperation is reduced and individuals might even be privately inefficient when 
confronted with resource scarcity, as they adopt a “race to the bottom for extraction-
profit” strategy. This hypothesis could be understood in different terms: the social 
dilemma associated with the use of a CPR becomes weaker as the private maximizing-
solution level moves towards that of the social (Pareto optimal) solution, whereby a 
lower level for the Nash equilibrium results from changes in the stock of the resource. 
3 Theoretical  model 
 
To accomplish our objective, we adopt the dynamic model of profit maximization 
postulated by Moreno and Maldonado (2008), which not only captures the social 
dilemma of common pool resources, but also incorporates the inter-temporal effects of 
aggregated extraction. 
  The model is based on an individual fisherman benefit function that is non-linear 
in both the level of private extraction (x) and the level of resource stock (S). The benefits 
(and costs) that individuals obtain from the extraction activity are, in turn, divided into 
two parts: i) the private benefit f(.), which depends on the level of extraction (x), but the 
costs of which depend on the availability of the resource (S); and ii) the collective 
benefits or costs g(.),resulting from the extraction decisions made by all of the fishermen 
using the resource such as affect its availability for other fishermen.
1 This benefit 
function represents the profits from a common-pool resource (CPR) characterized by 
non-exclusion and rivalry:  
) (
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where  0 , 0 , 0 ≥ ≥ > γ β α  are the parameters, and  t i, π indicates the benefits fisherman i 
obtains during period t from extracting the resource. The private portion of benefits, f(.), 
is assumed to be a quadratic function of extraction (in order to capture the decreasing 
marginal benefits of extracting), and non-linear for the stock of the resource, with the 
                                                           




assumption of a reserve-dependent cost (i.e., that the cost increases with a reduction in 
the stock, though not linearly). Function f(.) represents a profit function, the revenues of 
which depend on parameter α (the market price of the resource), and the costs of which 
depend directly on the extraction and inversely on the stock. The collective portion of 
the benefit, function g(.), is assumed to be linear for the level of extraction, and 
represents the effect of joint extraction on individual benefits. Parameter e represents 
the maximum amount that each fisherman can extract, and is assumed to be equal for 
all fishermen. Additionally, aggregated for n fishermen—that is, ne—it reflects the 








shows the availability of the resource following its extraction by n fishermen. Parameter 
γ represents the proportion of common-pool resource availability affecting individual 
benefits (Moreno and Maldonado, 2008).  
  On the other hand, the resource stock changes according to the evolution 
equation in expression (2): 
  ∑
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The evolution equation states that the amount of the resource in period t+1 will 
equal the stock at the beginning of period t, minus the extraction of all fishermen during 
that period, plus the net growth function, which in this case depends on the parameters 
 θ  and K
2. 
  The Nash equilibrium of this model is obtained through the maximization of each 
fisherman’s benefits over time, subject to the evolution equation: 
 




x δλ γ α
β .          ( 3 )  
  This expression represents the Nash equilibrium for the game and shows that the 
optimum private extraction depends positively on the stock and parameter α (,i.e., the 
price of the resource), and negatively on the parameter associated with extraction costs 
                                                           
2 We can assume that the growth function is a logistic function, one where parameter θ represents the implicit growth 
rate and parameter K the carrying capacity of the resource. 11 
 
(β), the impact of aggregated extraction (γ), and the discounted inter-temporal price of 
the stock of the resource (δλt+1).  
To obtain the level of extraction maximizing the social welfare, a central planner 
would aggregate the benefits of all of the individuals, in this case, n fishermen, subject 
to the evolution equation of the stock (Moreno and Maldonado, 2008): 
∑
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The Pareto optimum resulting from the first order condition with respect to the 
extraction would be: 
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.          ( 5 )  
Expression (5) shows that the social level of extraction must be lower than that in 
expression (3), as the proportion wherein the availability of CPR affects benefits (γ) 
must be aggregated as the total number of fishermen, n, in order to capture the full 
costs of extraction decisions (Moreno and Maldonado, 2008). 
This model, therefore, shows that private extraction decisions should differ from 
social optimum ones, moreover, that they can range across an ample spectrum 
depending on the value of the parameters and, particularly, on the level of stock. Lower 
resource levels should lead to lower levels of extraction as an efficient private decision.  
4 Empirical  Model 
4.1  The model simulation and pay-off structure 
 
In order to construct a pay-off structure that recreates the conflict between the collective 
and private interests represented in expression (1), Moreno and Maldonado (2008) 
assign specific values to the parameters in expressions (3) and (5). The parameters 
used are: α = 100; β = 800; and γ = 20. In addition, they determine the range of 12 
 
plausible extraction equal to [1, 8] and e  = 8, following previous field experiments 
conducted by Cardenas (2004). 
The dynamic model proposed by Moreno and Maldonado (2008), wherein 
changes in stock affect individual benefits, yields many Nash equilibriums for each level 
of stock resulting from each possible aggregated extraction. In order to make the game 
practical, easy and understandable for real fishermen, the researchers simulated 
solutions for only two levels of stock: a high level (one of abundance) and a low level 
(one of scarcity); correspondingly, it was only necessary to construct two payoff tables, 
one for each stock level. The pay-off tables show the benefits that each individual 
obtains from different combinations of individual and aggregated extractions (Appendix 
1). In these tables, one can observe that as individual i increases his or her extraction, 
the respective payoff increase (at a decreasing rate); on the other hand, as aggregate 
extraction increases, i´s payoff decreases. This simulates the social dilemma between 
individual and collective interests. 
The dynamic setting of the model generates two implications with respect to 
players’ decisions, the first regarding the effect of the aggregated extraction during 
period t on the resource stock at period t+1; and the second, regarding the effect of the 
inter-temporal discount rate on the individual paths of extraction decisions. Therefore, 
even assuming just two levels of stock, the model still yields several private Nash 
equilibriums, depending on individuals’ respective discount rates. Assuming that a 
player does not take into account the inter-temporal effects of his or her decisions, the 
model predicts that, with respect to his or her private extraction decisions, the term 
δλ will converge to zero.
3 Consequently, expression (5) becomes: 






x .           (6) 
Expression (6) is equivalent to a myopic Nash equilibrium, and we use it to 
calculate the theoretical benchmarks and payoff tables used in the experiment. Utilizing 
the parameters mentioned above and assuming an abundant stock—that SH = 80— we 
arrive at a Nash equilibrium of 8 units; this corresponds to a corner solution, as the 
range of plausible extraction is [1, 8]. In order to simulate resource scarcity, we assume 
                                                           
3 This is equivalent to a discount rate (ρ) converging to infinite. 13 
 
that SL = 40 and ceteris paribus; correspondingly, we obtain a Nash equilibrium of 4 
units, which corresponds to an interior solution. Notice that, although under resource 
scarcity, the Nash equilibrium is four units, individuals might still extract any amount 
between one and eight units. Correspondingly, for this case, players may deviate from 
the Nash Equilibrium both downward and upward. Given that cost function is reserve-
dependent, the benefits under abundance are higher than those under scarcity; this is 
true for all levels of extraction. Figure 1 illustrates the average benefits a player may 
obtain under the two states. 
Deviations below the Nash equilibriums imply that individuals either incorporate 
collective interests into individual decisions, or incorporate with respect to current 
decisions a consideration of the future consequences of present actions. In the case of 
low stock, deviations above the Nash equilibrium imply private and social inefficiency, 
as individuals are making extraction decisions that result in less benefits than those 
associated with the Nash equilibrium (less extraction); additionally, they are acting more 
resource-harmful than theory predicts, thus exacerbating the tragedy of the fisheries. 
 
 





























Using the same parameters, Moreno and Maldonado (2008) adjust the social 
optimum equal to one unit
4; this will also be used in our analyses.  
 
4.2 Experimental  design 
 
Based on the theoretical model, we design a CPR economic experimental game 
consisting of two phases, both of which are made up of ten rounds of decisions. 
Individuals were organized in groups of five participants, and for every round, each 
player had to decide in private a level of extraction from one to eight units of resource. A 
player’s extraction decisions generate points, which are convertible into monetary units. 
On average, US$10 was paid to each person, which is equivalent to a daily wage per 
person for the region being considered.  
The inter-temporal effect of aggregated extraction is captured by the fact that a 
group’s extraction during one period will affect the stock level during the following 
period. For simplicity’s sake, in our design, individuals may only arrive at two stock 
levels: a high level (one of abundance) and a low level (one of scarcity). The dynamic 
part of the game was designed as follows: if in round t the aggregated extraction (that 
is, for a five-person group) exceeds 20 units, during the next round (round t+1), each 
individual will be confronted with resource scarcity; consequently, during round t+1, they 
will use the low availability payoff table to calculate their earnings. Under scarcity, every 
unit of extraction pays out fewer points, as a low availability of resource implies more 
effort per unit of catch, which in turn generates, ceteris paribus, lower benefits. 
Conversely, if extraction by the whole group during period t is less than or equal to 20 
units, during period t+1, the resource will be abundant; less effort is required per unit of 
catch, and the activity generates higher returns. In that case, the group will use the high 
availability payoff table in the following round (t+1). 
During the first phase, players are not subjected to any rules, while during the 
second phase, they are subjected to three different rules: internal regulation, external 
                                                           
4 Although our parameters generate a theoretical social optimum of zero units, we follow Cardenas (2004), who 
argues that it is convenient to eliminate the zero extraction option so as to avoid conflicts when conducting 
experiments arising because of villagers’ strong aversion towards any prohibition against using resources. 
Additionally, in the NNP-CRSB, fishermen are allowed to extract resources for “self-consumption.” 15 
 
regulation, and a combination of both. An analysis of the management rules was 
already carried out by Moreno and Maldonado (2008); therefore, this paper will not 
address issues related to the performance of the rules independently but only jointly, so 
that we might better concentrate our analysis efforts on the over-extraction hypothesis.  
Recall that, according to the profit maximization model and assuming completely 
myopic behavior, the expected Nash equilibrium for the game under abundance 
(scarcity) reflects an aggregated extraction of 40 units (20 units), which implies 8 units 
per player under high stock, and 4 units per player under low stock. The social optimum 
is a level of aggregated extraction of 5 units (1 unit each).  
 
4.3 Operative  procedures 
 
EEGs were performed involving 230 individuals from eight fishing communities located 
in the vicinity of the National Natural Park Corales del Rosario y San Bernardo (NNP-
CRSB) in the Colombian Caribbean. 
At every location, participants were organized into groups of five individuals and 
seated back to back in order to guarantee the anonymity and confidentiality of individual 
decisions. In addition, a supervisor monitored and controlled the game in order to 
ensure that rules were understood and adhered to. The supervisor was also in charge 
of collecting the cards on which the participants wrote their extraction decisions.  
Experts on the environmental education of communities explained the game to 
the fishermen using different visual aids such as drawings, pictures and posters. Three 
practice rounds were performed before starting the actual game. 
5  The analytical methods and results 
 
In order to analyze the behavior of participants in the EEG, likewise, to address the 
research question, we adopt the following methodological approach, wherein we utilize 
individual extraction decisions from the first phase of the game (the first 10 rounds, 
during which no rules were applied): 16 
 
1.  We analyze the frequency of individual extraction decisions and relative deviations 
from the Nash equilibrium for each resource state, and classify those decisions 
according to their relationship with the theoretically predicted equilibriums. The 
differences are then tested statistically. Based on this analysis, we look for decision 
patterns that help to explain players’ behavior, particularly when they decide to 
extract above the Nash equilibrium. Our categories of individual behavior are drawn 
from this analysis. 
2.  As with individual decisions, we search for group decision patterns, especially when 
these decisions fall above the Nash equilibriums. We then construct categories 
reflective of group behavior. 
3.  We examine the relationship between individual behavior and group behavior so as 
to identify patterns of extraction and the effect that groups can have on individuals. 
4. Finally, we run an econometric model that explains differences in extraction 
decisions and deviations from the Nash equilibrium as, among other variables, a 
function of socioeconomic factors and resource states. 
The procedures and results are presented in the following sections.  
 
5.1 Individual  decisions 
 
The first step is to analyze the frequency of extraction decisions for every state. Figure 2 
shows that for high stock, we observe with greater frequency extraction decisions of 
more than five units; 8-unit extraction is the most frequent decision. In the same figure, 
we observe that when players are confronted with scarcity, extraction distribution is 
more uniform across the whole range of extraction possibilities. Given that the Nash 
equilibrium for low stock is interior, at this level, there are extractions that should not be 
observed (those above four units), as they generate lower benefits than those obtained 
at the level of extraction that is privately efficient. Extractions above four units under 
scarcity are inefficient, both privately and socially, since the resource is being 
overexploited without any marginal benefit (and, in fact, even at a marginal loss). From 
this figure, it can also be deducted that most of the rounds (60 percent of them) 17 
 
occurred at a low level of stock, while 40 percent of the rounds were played at a high 
level of stock.  
To compare the extraction decisions for the two levels of stock, we calculate the 
difference between actual extraction and the expected private Nash equilibrium. This 
measure is what we call the deviation from the Nash equilibrium.  
 
 
Figure 2. The frequency of different extraction decisions at high and low stocks. 
 
These deviations are classified in groups according to their respective Nash 
equilibriums. Figure 3 shows that for high stock, 83 percent of decisions were below the 
equilibrium, implying that they reflect either others-regarding preferences or forward-
looking behavior. For low stock, 86 percent of decisions were made outside of the Nash 
equilibriums, though 46% were privately inefficient decisions. It is worth noticing that 
when the Nash equilibrium is closer to the social optimum (scarcity), players arrived at 
the social optimum more frequently (12%). 
In summary, when confronted with scarcity, individuals tended to utilize inefficient 
extraction strategies for almost half of the rounds, thus exacerbating the tragedy of the 
commons by extracting not only more than the social optimum, but also more than their 
respective private Nash equilibrium. 
12345678
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Frequency of extractions18 
 
 
Figure 3. Classification of the deviations from the Nash equilibrium for each resource 
state.  
 
These findings have several implications: 
-  When scarcity appears, either collective action or forward-looking strategies are 
reduced; 
-  The greater the “distance” between the Nash equilibrium and the social optimum, 
the less likely it is that players will arrive at the optimum.  
-  Under low stock, individuals tend to behave inefficiently, both in private and 
social terms. 
Our results coincide with those found in some of the economic literature where it is 
shown that individuals will likely deviate upward or downward from Nash equilibriums, 
particularly where public goods are concerned (Isaac and Walker, 1998). Much as with 
those authors, we have found, for the mirror case of a CPR, that when confronted with a 
situation of scarcity, players will over-extract the resource—that is, they will make 
decisions above the Nash equilibrium. In doing so, they obtain less profits, undermine 
the others-regarding interest, and exacerbate the tragedy of the commons. 
  To validate these results, we test statistically whether there are significant 
differences between decisions at the two stock levels, low and high. Table 1 shows 
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Deviations from Nash equilibrium19 
 
Nash equilibrium, and relative deviations from the Nash equilibrium.
5 The analysis of 
statistical differences is only useful for the latter variable. Two tests on differences are 
used: a t-test on averages and a Mann-Whitney test. 
 








deviation from Nash 
Low stock  4.357  -0.357  -8.9% 
High stock  5.035  2.965  37.1% 
Difference     -46.0%*** 
Mann Whitney z      -20.98*** 
* significant at 10%  ** significant at 5%  *** significant at 1% 
 
Differences between relative deviations from the Nash equilibrium are highly 
statistically significant, showing that decisions under high stock differ from those under 
low stock. 
  Additionally, we think that over-extracting behavior under scarcity may be 
associated with certain particular individuals, and not with the whole set of players. To 
test this hypothesis, we divide the sample according to the number of rounds in which 
every participant played above the Nash equilibrium.  
Based on this, participants were categorized depending on the average number 
of rounds in which they decided to play above the Nash equilibrium: some never played 
above it, others played less than half of the time above it, and still others played more 
than half of the time above it. The results, presented in Figure 4, show that one quarter 
of participants never played above the Nash equilibrium; almost another quarter played 
above the Nash equilibrium more than half of the rounds; and about half of the 
participants played less than half of the time above the Nash equilibrium (though did so 
at least once). 
                                                           
5 The relative deviation from Nash for every individual is calculated as [Nash eq. – extraction] / Nash eq. 20 
 
 
Figure 4 Categories of players according to their behavior with respect to the Nash 
equilibrium. 
 
These findings imply that, individually, some players may have pro-social 
attitudes (“good guys” in social and environmental terms), some have individualistic 
attitudes, and some have exacerbating attitudes, even if suffering economic losses as a 
consequence of acting them out (“bad guys” in social and environmental terms). 
 
5.2 Group  decisions 
 
To analyze group behavior, we perform the same analysis for groups as we did for 
individuals.  
We found that while some groups acted cooperatively and sustainably—that is, 
they never extracted above the Nash equilibrium (23%)—others played most of the 
rounds above the Nash equilibrium (38%). These findings are presented in Figure 5.  
Comparing individual and group behavior, it might be deduced that “bad guys” 
were more widely dispersed than “good guys” among the groups, thus generating 
inefficient behavior in a larger share of groups (38%). “Good guys,” conversely, appear 





























Figure 5. Categories of groups according to their behavior with respect to the Nash 
equilibrium. 
 
Similar to individual results, some groups consistently behaved cooperatively by 
never extracting above the Nash equilibrium (“good” groups in social and environmental 
terms); some groups exhibited behavior closer to the Nash equilibrium; and some 
groups repeatedly extracted in an inefficient way (“bad” groups in social and 
environmental terms). 
Inasmuch as there are individuals that behave inefficiently throughout the game 
and individuals that consistently exhibit pro-social behavior throughout the game, 
likewise, groups that show similar patterns, the question becomes whether or not “good 
guys” always belong to “good” groups. In Figure 6, we observe that good players 
coincide with good groups for a high proportion of the rounds associated with good 
groups (77%); similarly, bad guys coincide with bad groups for more than 60 percent of 
the rounds associated with bad groups.  
In those groups that over-extracted the resource, 25 percent of the players were 
“good guys,” in the sense that they made an effort to not over-extract the resource. 
They consistently tried to reduce the group’s extraction, but their effort was canceled out 
by the inefficient behavior of the rest of the group. As a result, most of the time, they 
were confronted with scarcity, and consequently, their profits were reduced. Conversely, 























and derived profit from it; at the same time, the pro-social behavior of their respective 
groups kept them in abundance, as a consequence of which they ended up making 
greater profits. In essence, they are free riders that took advantage of high levels of 
extraction while their groups, through their overall efficient and pro-social decisions, 
maintained high resource availability. 
 
  
Figure 6. The relationship between individual and group decisions with respect to the 
Nash equilibrium. 
 
These free riders may erode their respective group’s pro-social behavior and 
induce good players to start playing inefficiently. On the other hand, good players in bad 
groups may send signals to the other players through their behavior that they should 
reduce their over-extraction. To analyze if such cases were observed, we calculated the 
average extraction decisions of players categorized according to their extraction 
patterns and the type of group to which they belonged: pro-social or good guys playing 
in either good or bad groups, and inefficient or bad guys playing in either good or bad 
groups. The results are presented in Figure 7. It can be observed, in fact, that bad guys 
maintained inefficient behavior throughout the game, as on average, they extracted 
above four units, while the pro-social behavior of good guys was evident in an average 
extraction consistently lower than four units. However, the behavior of the bad guys was 
influenced by their respective group’s behavior, as their average extraction was lower 















other hand, the behavior of the good guys was also affected by the type of group to 
which they belonged; when belonging to a bad group, good guys were forced to reduce 
their extraction even further than what would have been the case if belonging to a good 
group—that is, the good guys sacrificed their own benefits in order to keep their 
respective group pro-social. These results show that groups matter. 
 
  
Figure 7. The average extraction of individuals according to Nash categories. 
 
The second part of the game involved the introduction of rules aimed at increasing 
collective action and behavior efficiency. These rules included external regulation, 
internal regulation (communication), and a non-coercive combination of the two (co-
management). The findings show that the rules were effective in reducing extraction 
(Moreno and Maldonado, 2008). However, under scarcity, deviations below the Nash 
equilibrium continued to be statistically lower than those corresponding to a situation of 
abundance.  
 
5.3 Econometric  analysis 
 
The results concerning our hypothesis that, under scarcity, individuals exacerbate the 
tragedy of the commons by making decisions above the private Nash equilibrium are 
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  In the proposed econometric model, the explained variable is the relative 
deviation from the Nash equilibrium
6 (RDNi,t), which depends on: i) the conditions of the 
game (i.e., the current-round´s stock level (St), the group’s extraction  (Σxt-1=X-i,t-1) and 
individual’s extraction (xi,t-1) during the previous round); ii) the type of group to which a 
participant belongs (a good group (GGi,t),  a Nash group or  a bad group (BGi,t)); iii) 
certain demographic and socioeconomic conditions (age, education and income); and 
iv) perceptions about the protected area. The econometric model can be written as: 
 
￿.￿  ￿  ￿￿  ￿￿,￿￿￿  ￿	￿￿,￿￿￿  ￿
￿,￿  ￿￿,￿  ￿￿  ￿￿  ￿￿
 ￿￿  ￿￿￿  ￿,￿ 
 
Demographic, socioeconomic and perception-related variables were collected 
through a survey of the players after the game had concluded. Given that the decisions 
of each individual over ten rounds are not independent, we adopt a panel data structure 
so that any error associated with the rounds within a particular player can be separated 
from errors related to between-individuals variations. As the model uses lagged 
variables, information about the first round is dropped. The results for the estimated 
econometric model are presented in Table 2. 
  The relationship between dependent and independent variables should be 
interpreted as follows: positive coefficients imply that any increase in the independent 
variable will result in a greater pro-social attitude by the player. Conversely, negative 
coefficients mean that an increase in the independent variable will result in more self-
centered or even privately inefficient behavior.  
The findings show that the resource stock during a current round has a positive 
relationship with the relative deviation from the Nash equilibrium during that period. This 
implies that if a current round exhibits abundance, for period t, on average, extraction 
decisions will exhibit greater relative deviation from the Nash equilibrium towards the 
social optimum. On the other hand, every additional unit of individual extraction during 
the previous round (t-1) will result in an upward deviation during the current round, 
                                                           
6 Recall that the relative deviation from the Nash equilibrium for every individual is calculated as [Nash eq. – 
extraction] / Nash eq. 25 
 
period t. This confirms that “bad guys” tend to remain “bad” throughout the game. 
Conversely, greater extraction by some group members during a previous round 
encourages individuals during the current round to behave cooperatively; they thus 
deviate downward from the Nash equilibrium.  
 
Table 2. Panel regression explaining individual relative deviations from the Nash 
equilibrium.  
Dependent variable: relative deviation from Nash  Coefficient  Std. Err.
Resource stock current round (1 = high, 0 = low)  0.059*  0.032 
Own extraction previous round (1-8 units)  -0.056***  0.005 
Other members’ extraction previous round (4-32 units)  0.005*  0.003 
Belonging to a bad group (1 = bad group, 0 = no bad group)  -0.294***  0.042 
Belonging to a good group (1 = good group, 0 = no good 
group) 0.202***  0.043 
Age (years)  0.001*  0.001 
Education (years of education)  0.018***  0.003 
Per capita income (monthly minimum wages)  -0.168***  0.042 
Has received info about protected area (1 = yes, 0 = no)  0.068***  0.024 
Willingness to collaborate with park management (1=yes, 
0=no) 0.074***  0.022 
Constant -0.086 
ns 0.096 
Observations 2,164  Groups  196 
R-sq within groups  0.142 
R-sq between groups  0.765 
R-sq overall  0.379 
Wald Chi-sq(k)  1,313 
* significant at 10%  ** significant at 5%  *** significant at 1%  
ns not significant 
 
The categorical variables used to capture group effects show significant coefficients 
and the expected signs: being in a ‘good’ group is associated with deviations towards 
the social optimum, while being in a bad group is associated with deviations towards 26 
 
inefficient behavior. These results confirm the conclusion that the type of group matters 
and that there is a group effect on deviation. 
  With respect to demographic variables, we observe that the greater the age and 
level of education, the greater the deviation away from the Nash equilibrium; older and 
more educated players tended to move towards the social optimum. 
  Per capita income shows a negative relationship with respect to the degree of 
deviation away from the Nash equilibrium, implying that less poor individuals extract 
closer to the Nash equilibrium or above it. This result challenges the usual assumption 
that poorer people impact more heavily on natural resources. However, the surveyed 
communities exhibited a small amount of variance with respect to the income variable. 
Finally, individuals who received some information (through training, workshops, 
etc.) about the importance of the protected area (INFO), or who indicated a willingness 
to collaborate with environmental authorities in the management of the park (WTC), 
deviated downward from the Nash equilibrium to a greater extent—that is, they were 
more interested in reducing extraction and moving toward social solutions. 
6 Conclusions 
 
The objective of this paper was to investigate whether deviations downward from the 
Nash equilibrium in CPR economic experimental games—which have been explained in 
the literature as a result of collective behavior or others-regarding preferences—are 
affected by resource availability. To do that, we developed an EEG for a CPR with real 
fishing communities at a national park in the Colombian Caribbean, and simulated two 
stock levels (scarcity and abundance), using a benefit function—quadratic with respect 
to private extractions and non-linear with respect to the stock level—which in turn 
generated two Nash equilibriums.  
Although other EEGs performed with local communities have demonstrated that 
individuals deviate downward from the Nash equilibrium—deviating away from the 
myopic and individualistic behavior predicted by non-cooperative game theory and 
Hardin (1968)—our findings show that under scarcity, individuals reduce their pro-social 
behavior, and might even be privately inefficient, and thus deviate upward from the 27 
 
Nash equilibrium. In terms of resource sustainability, such inefficient behavior implies 
that individuals not only obtain less profit and undermine others-regarding preferences, 
they also exacerbate the tragedy of the commons. 
  Much as with previous studies (Isaac and Walker, 1998; and Willinger and 
Ziegelmeyer, 2001), we find that the “distance” from the theoretical social optimum to 
the private Nash equilibrium is important for defining the chances of arriving at the 
social optimum. Under scarcity, the private Nash equilibrium is closer to the social 
optimum; therefore, we are more likely to observe individuals making decisions that 
correspond with that optimum. 
As with Isaac and Walker (1998), we find that there are individuals that act as free 
riders vis-à-vis their fellow group members; they extract at the Nash equilibrium or over 
it, even while the latter consistently remain “highly cooperative,” and try to deviate 
downward from the Nash equilibrium. Seven percent of the players associated with 
“good” groups consistently over-extracted during the game, even while their respective 
groups maintained high stock availability for them, thus allowing them to obtain greater 
profits. They are effectively free riders of the “good” groups, groups that maintained high 
resource availability through their efficient and pro-social decisions. 
Similarly to Herr et al. (1997) who, analyzed the effect of time on externalities 
associated with the extraction of non-renewable resources, we find that the myopic 
behavior of individuals not only exacerbates the CPR problem, but also affects the 
behavior of non-myopic individuals, leading all group members to a race for the 
resource; group behavior matters and individual extraction is positively related with the 
type of group to which said individual belongs—this reflects reciprocity attitudes: “they 
extract more in previous period, therefore I will extract more at current period.” 
The results from our parametric analysis confirm our non-parametric tests with 
respect to, among other things, our central question: resource abundance induces 
individuals to deviate further downward from the Nash equilibrium. Socio-economic and 
demographic variables may also shape the pattern of over-extraction; older and more 
educated players tend to extract at levels closer to the social optimum.  
Analysis of the impact of income challenges the assumption that the poorest exert 
the most damage on the environment; however, income statistics show that most of the 28 
 
players are below the poverty line, and that the variance between individuals is, in the 
end, low. 
Variables associated with perceptions concerning the importance of the natural park 
indicate that they play an important role with respect to decisions about the use of the 
CPR. Players that have received some training about the protected area or that are 
interested in collaborating with the protected area’s management show a greater 
tendency to deviate downward from Nash equilibrium.  
When rules are included in the game, a significant portion of this inefficient behavior 
vanished. This result highlights the importance of certain institutions in managing 
resources and controlling the threat of the tragedy the commons, or at the least, 
minimizing the exacerbation of such conduct. 
Our findings provide information that might be useful in the formulation of 
management strategies for common pool resources; in particular, when CPRs are 
facing deterioration and local users perceive them as scarce. Individuals might be less 
interested in cooperating when the resource is becoming depleted; therefore, with 
respect to resources that are highly threatened, management strategies might best 
focus on zoning, the establishment of non-take zones and exerting control. However, 
when a resource is abundant, management strategies might be more effective if local 
user participation is involved. 
This research  shows that the collective behavior of individuals facing a CPR 
dilemma in an EEG is not a rule, and depends on the condition of the stock; under 
scarcity, individuals deviate from cooperative behavior and may even engage in a race 
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Appendix 1. Pay-off tables  
Green payoff table for HIGH resource availability and pink payoff table for LOW 
resource availability. 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 